

APPRAISING INDIA'S ROLE IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATION IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN

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Abstract: *India has long invested in promoting goodwill among African states by participating in United Nations Peace keeping operations. India is the third largest contributor of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations and has contributed to various missions across the world including in Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, and more recently, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. As part of a broader push to build stronger ties to African countries, India has redoubled its commitment to peacekeeping efforts over the past decade, and in the views of many in the UN peacekeeping system, the capacity of Indian peacekeepers makes them essential to any peacekeeping effort on the continent. India also possess the capacity to provide well trained troops who are accustomed to operating in a diverse array of terrain. In addition, the paper will assess India's strategy of using peacekeeping as a tool of foreign policy. This paper will assess the role of India in the South Sudan Crisis. The paper's source of data will be essentially secondary involving books, journals; articles on the subject matter under review.*

Keywords: *Africa, India, United Nations, Peacekeeping, South Sudan*

1. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has witnessed considerable growth in the number of Peace keeping operations in the international arena. This has been experienced in Africa with a high level of conflict which have been accompanied by economic collapse, human right abuses and loss of life. Peacekeeping have sought to bring an end to hostilities, preventing further conflict and providing humanitarian assistance and facilitating post conflict state building. However peacekeeping is politically, legally and morally contentious on account of the fact that it involves the exercise of extra-territorial influence, violating the supposed immutability of insular forms of sovereignty (Agnew, 2005; Dodds, 2005). Deploying peacekeepers is also potentially costly, and exposes countries to varying degrees of risk (for soldiers' lives, countries' reputation, etc.) (Chopra, 1996, Mingst, 2003, Welsh, 2003). However there are two implications which come

from these observations. The first is that individual states must possess interests in dispatching peacekeepers for a specific operation (Nye, 2003). Second, a country's participation must be perceived as legitimate, not only by domestic constituencies, but also influential actors within target states and the wider international community (Wheeler, 2002). It is our contention that states' participation in particular operations will be determined by a range of domestic and extra-domestic factors which shape interests in peacekeeping and their ability to legitimate intervention.

Ever since achieving independence in 1947, India has continually participated in UN peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world, and in various capacities. A significant number of these commitments have been undertaken in Africa, where during the continent's post-colonial period, interventions by the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and lately, the African Union (AU). India is on the threshold of its fifth decade as a major contributor to the UN it is appropriate, therefore is vital we appraise the role of India in its peacekeeping exercise in South Sudan under the UN flag. This paper is divided into five sections namely theoretical framework, the second section is on South Sudan crisis, third is on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, while the fourth is on Indian contribution to UN peacekeeping in south sudan. Lastly the conclusion.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The paper shall adopt realist theory. The main advocate of the realist theory of international politics is Hans J. Morgenthau (1948), due to the profound depth of insight offered in his classic text; *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948) published shortly after World War II. Morgenthau is today considered as the father of Modern realist (Kaarbo et al, 2011:4). Other notable advocates of the realist theory include; Reihold Niebhur (1953), Nicolas Spykman (1942), K. J. Holsti(2002), Klans Knorr(1961) and George F. Kennan (1954).

Realist theory believes that states are the most important actors in International politics. States aim at maximizing their power in advancing their interest. Realist theory is anchored on a number of propositions. The first major proposition of the theory is states are the most important actors in global politics. Realism is state-centric because it accentuates the centrality of states in global politics and pushes other actors to a lower level of scientific awareness. As territorially-based political units, these entities called states exercise supreme authority over a defined territory. (Kaarbo et al, 2011; 4-5; Brown 2005:63; Nar, 2009:30; Reinalda, 2009:5). Moreover states possess the element of sovereignty, and thus no other actor in the international system has the right to interfere in their internal affairs. As sovereign entities states do not submit to any superior authority, whether externally or internally. States exist in a world composed of other similarly characterized sovereign political units (Kaarbo et al 2011:4-5; Brown, 2005:64).

The other proposition is that states pursue their interests, define as power. The theory perceives power as pivotal and inescapable element of international politics. Every State must follow a self-help strategy to protect and maintain its own interest within the international political system, foreign policy becomes naturally competitive and dynamic with states eyeing one another with suspicion (Aremu et al 2013:25; Sessay et al 2012:91; Kaarbo et al 2011:6; Reinalda, 2009:7).

From the realist angle the idea of 'sovereignty' principally defines domestic politics the strategy of 'self-help' characterizes foreign policies (Reinalda, 2009:7). Realist claim that we live in an anarchic world with competing states that want power domestically as well as to accumulate power internationally. Realists believe that the main goal of all players in international politics is to accumulate power, focusing on the nation state and its quest to promote its own national interest. The theory puts other players at a lower position. Large multinational corporations and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) are viewed as tools of the powerful states. The states needs to survive and these entities are there to support this.

Some realist like John Mearsheimer (2001), further argue that the ultimate goal for states is to achieve hegemony. On the other hand, the "realist explanation of state participation in UN peace-keeping [sic] is that states do whatever they can, given their power resources, to protect and preserve their national interests" (Neack,1995:184). According to this explanation, participation in peacekeeping is thus understood primarily as an instrument to foster states' national interests. Writing more recently, Gegout (2009) stated that within the realist perspective, national interests are not only defined in terms of "hard" military-security issues, but also in terms of economic interests and even states' prestige. Hence, realists simply "expect government-defined national interest to take precedence over altruistic humanitarianism" (Gegout, 2009: 238).

Realism is reflected in UN Peacekeeping when, rather than trying to establish international peace for its own sake, countries use peacekeeping to benefit themselves. Moreover realist would argue that peacekeeping provides an avenue for developing states to have an interest in other states. Realist scholars recognize the primary importance of states in pursuit of national interests on the world stage where they seek to advance gains and minimize losses (Gill and Huang, 2009; Hirst and Lienderrozas, 2008; Sorenson and Wood, 2005). The realist perspective begins with the structure and distribution of power in world politics and its impact on the commercial political and other interests of member states. For realists power primarily functions the determinant of states choices and behaviour. Realist argue that states are unitary rational actors in international relations and multilateral cooperation is a result of inter-state or inter governmental bargaining. They possess a notorious pessimism about the autonomy and impact of international organizations.

In realists view international organizations are often seen as merely effective means to protect national interests and to promote the economic and military power of the state where international organizations are acknowledged and they tend to be depicted as the tools of their members and thus are premised upon and protective of state sovereignty. Thus state remain the key actors, state control decision –making and the international organization itself is merely a new stage on which the drama of power politics can be performed. It is expected that all international corporations and organizations act within the limits of inter-state relations. From this perspective, international politics is a struggle for power between states each trying to maximize their own national interests?

Morgenthau (1960) constructed a theory aimed at a science of international politics, which also can provide statesmen with guidance for rational and prudent action. In a world that borders

on anarchy, states seek to accumulate power. The concept of interest defined as power is a universally valid principle for state action, since power enables state to pursue other goals (Morgenthau 1960: 10). For Morgenthau, the United Nations was merely a new “Setting” or arena for the continuance of the old technique of diplomacy (Morgenthau 1960: 497) and to a certain degree instruments for the interests of powerful states. According to John Mearsheimer, [r]realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of the power in the world. They are based on the self –interested calculations of the great powers and they have no independent effect on state behaviour” (Mearsheimer, 1994: 7).

The realist case is that international relations is made up of a system of states competing and driven by a need for power and survival. The role of international organizations is less on influencing state behaviour. Eventually states are influenced by their self-interests. States primarily use peacekeeping to promote national self-interests. Verification of realism is apparent because peacekeeping is often used to mask different political intentions (Glennon, 2002). One motivation for peacekeeping, mainly among developing countries is the economic motive. The UN pays each Troop Contributing Country (TCC) an amount of \$1,028 US dollars for each soldier per month (Hurd, 2010:301). Peacekeeping is used by states to resolve conflicts that threaten to disrupt international trade or personal economic interests. This is why TCCs were willing to deploy in the Middle East, because the region has major oil resources so conflicts may disrupt trade, causing an increase in the international price of oil. Neack (1995:188) shows evidence that from 1982 to 1986 many of the most frequent peace-keepers were ranked among the largest arms exporters in the Middle East. This proves the realist vision because although it may seem contradictory to conduct both arms sales and peacekeeping, both of these actions ultimately have the same pursuit of national interests.

As realism argues, International organizations play a subordinate role to states, which is evident in UN peacekeeping because International Organizations play only so much a role as states allow. The donation of funds, troops, and equipment are all conducted on a charitable basis; thus the decision of states to contribute as well as their conduct within a mission are all influenced by state interests. States limit the function of their troops e.g. solely an observation role and they can withdraw their contributions whenever they decide to. Another example of TCCs promoting their own interests within a peacekeeping mission is in the different ways they try to establish the security of their contingents on the ground. One example was France in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) they were concerned about the high risks that their troops would face in Lebanon, demanded more freedom of action for their soldiers and decided to deploy heavy tanks to the area (Hatto, 2009:186-198). Another example was Italy in Somalia, where “eyewitnesses said the Italians stood by and refused to come to the assistance of the Nigerians during the attack as a result of a deal that the Italian contingent made with Somalis” (Neack,1995:192). Realism is manifest in these actions because states act in their own interests.

3. BACKGROUND TO THE SOUTH SUDAN CRISIS

South Sudan is a landlocked country in East-Central Africa that gained its independence from Sudan in 2011. South Sudan is bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Southwest, and the Central African Republic to the west. The twentieth century was a period in human

history replete with never before seen violence. One cannot help but ask: What was the reason behind the proliferation of violence in the post colonial Sudan? Is it that violence is embedded in Sudanese cultures? It is vital to explore the grievances that led to the signing of the comprehensive peace Agreement. There is the need to looking at the politics of country creation in Southern Sudan and how it laid the groundwork for future conflicts.

She is known to have a long history of ethnic conflict and political instability ever since she gained independence from North Sudan in 2011. For one to have a basic understanding of the conflict in South Sudan you have to look at the two principal actors involved in the conflict; the central Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The Genesis of this conflict started from the colonial past like many territorial demarcations in the continent, Sudan's present borderlines were defined by colonial powers at the turn of the century. As a political entity, then Sudan like many African countries was an artificial creation. Sudan's ethnically and religiously diverse people were brought together for the first time under a centralized government and administration during the Turko-Egyptian colonial rule which lasted from 1820 to 1882 (Beshir, 1984:10). The Turko-Egyptian rulers penetrated the non-Islamic and non Arabic South, establishing trade routes and eventually securing roughly the present day borders of Sudan (Beshir, 1984). It did not come as a surprise when Sudan became independent in 1956 and the barrier between the two areas was lifted, the south found itself in an extremely disadvantaged position. It was not long before the clamour for a new status erupted.

Some sources describe the conflict as an ethno religious one where the Muslim central government's pursuits to impose sharia law on non-Muslim southerners led to violence and eventually to the civil war. (Library of Congress, 2016; PBS frontline, 2012; Bassam, 2008). Conflict represents the inequalities that exist in most African Countries caused by Bad governance and lack of accountability on the part of leaders. The conflict in Sudan was never a simple mutual affair between North and South. The divide between the two regions intersected essential problems that existed within both. The observation of identity also sets parameters to the extent of sacrifice that individuals and groups are willing to make for the benefit of the community. The issue of identity has been a major cause of violent conflicts on the African continent. According to Annan:

The widespread rise of what is called identity politics ,coupled with the fact that fewer than 20 per cent of all state are ethnically homogeneous ,means that political demagogues have little difficulty finding targets of opportunity and mobilizing support for chauvinist causes . The upsurge of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s provides stark evidences of the appalling human costs that this vicious exploitation of identity politics can generate (Annan, 1999).

Participation refers to voluntary actions and choices which are open to the individual for making demands of government and expressing support. The issue of participation can become problematic and lead to conflicts when individuals or group attempt to monopolize all available avenues for meaningful political participation to the exclusion of others, which has been the case of the active fighting between North and South took place in the centre of the country, around the old North-South internal boundary. In complicating matters, the area crossed by this poorly defined border turned out to be rich in oil, making it a vital source for both sides.

The issue of distribution refers to the differential spread of and access to, values and resources in society (Steadman, 1995). If politics can be defined in terms of "who get what,

when and how”, then the allocation of values and resources may be said to lie at the very heart of politics. The manner in which values are distributed determines the amount of justice, fairness, and equity that are attributable to a government. Conflicts that develop as a consequence of perceptions of inequality and relative deprivation are causally linked to the manner in which values are distributed in society (Gurr, 1974). The Conflict between North and South can be attributed to the perceived and inequality distribution of resources of South Sudan revenues, a large percentage of what obtains from the south. Oil in commercial quantity was discovered in 1978 by Chevron near the towns of Bentiu and Heglig, close to the North-South boundary (Bassam, 2008). The discovery was an opportunity for the North to maintain control while providing added incentives to the southern rebels to fight for control of the territory. The town Heglig created a dangerous situation, it was situated in an area where the boundary was particularly ill-defined and was thus laying claim to both North and South.

At the time of the oil discovery, Sudan had been enjoying most peaceful period in its troubled post-independence history. An agreement signed in Addis Ababa in 1972 had put an end to the southern uprising; transforming Sudan into an asymmetrical federation where southern held positions in the central government but also enjoyed a degree of autonomy (Shinn, 2005). In the early 1980s, the North underwent another upheaval that put an end to peace. The war raged in the centre of the country, with the northern government fomenting divisions and tribal clashes in the South. New factors further complication this context. The growing competition to control oil resources in the country’s centre accompanied by a change in Sudan’s foreign oil partners as western oil companies rejected Sudanese policies and withdrew from the country with Chinese, Malaysian and India companies stepping in.

The signing of the CPA in 2005 put an end to open North-South warfare but all other problems continued to simmer. Roughly two million people died as a result of war, famine and disease caused by the conflict. Four million people in Southern Sudan were displaced at least once during the war. The civilian death toll is one of the highest any war since world war two (US Committee for Refugees ,2001). It was marked by a large number of human rights violations .These include slavery and mass killings. This Conflict represents the inequalities that exist in most African Countries caused by Bad governance and lack of accountability on the part of her leaders.

4. UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SOUTH SUDAN (UNMISS)

Peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council. The United Nations (UN) organ is primary responsible for maintaining international peace and security .The Council decides the operation’s size, its overall objectives and its time frame. As the UN has no military or civilian police force of its own, member states voluntarily decide whether to participate in a mission and if so, what personnel and equipment they are willing to bring. The performance of a peacekeeping operation determines on a clear and practicable mandate, effective command at Headquarters and in the field, efficient logistics systems, the sustained political and financial support of member states and perhaps most importantly the cooperation of the conflicting parties. It is expected that the mission must have the consent of the government in the country where it is deployed .The combination of these saw the establishment of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

On the 9th January 2005, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the government of Sudan (GOS) signed a peace agreement called the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which ended the Conflict in Southern Sudan that had been going on Since 1983. The CPA was the outcome of the Machakos Peace Process, which began in July 2002 (Brosche, 2007:2). It was composed of six partial agreements that have been signed by the two parties. The Agreement included important stipulations for South Sudan to achieve the goal of self determination for the people through a referendum which will be organised in 2011. The signatories to the CPA came to the realisation that South Sudan had been continuously dominated by North Sudan (Nyaba, 2010). Resources were not allocated equally between the regions. Power was highly centralised in the hands of a few in Khartoum. To cite one case, the process of Sudanisation of civil service, this took place shortly after the Juba conference of 1947, resulted in only six out of 800 posts going to the Southerners (Bassiouni, 2010).

The CPA was set out to correct the imbalances through power sharing, decentralisation of authority, equally allocation of revenue from oil to the government of Southern Sudan. The area of reform of national and local institutions of governance (LSE, 2010). According to the CPA too much centralisation of power in Khartoum was part of the problem of Sudan; so decentralisation becomes a defacto solution. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established by the UN Security Council under Resolution 1590 of 24th March 2005 in response to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on 9th January 2005 in Nairobi Kenya. UNMIS tasks are to support the implementation of the comprehensive Peace Agreement to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, protection, promotion of human rights and to support African Union Mission in Sudan. 10,000 military personnel including some 750 military observers, as well as 715 civilian police, 1018 international civilian staff, 2623 national staff and 214 UN Volunteers. Troops were located in six different sectors with military observer in charge of observing the ceasefire. Force protection was to be provided by various contributing countries.

On 8th July 2011, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1996 authorising the deployment of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) . This preceded the independence of South on 9th July 2011, Based on the results of a national referendum which the population voted for South Sudanese independence. In practice UNMISS took over from the previous UN presence in Sudan (UNMIS) with a significantly reconfigured mandate. UNMISS was created off the back of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) which functioned from 2005 to 2011 which supported and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan (GOS) and the South Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). To complement Southern independence, UNMISS was tasked to help "Consolidate peace and security and foster conditions for development in the new state (UNMISS Fact sheet,n,d). The mission was formed under mandate logic of peace consolidation through state building. An explicitly political mission, UNMISS was to support Government of South Sudan (GOSS) extend state authority across a profoundly underdeveloped territory and to support security sector reform through police training and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).

At the same time, UNMISS was established under a robust chapter VII mandate ,permitting it to take “all necessary actions” to protect civilians including through the use of force and was staffed with a large human rights section with a second reporting line to the independent United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The focus of UNMISS engagement with the security sector was reframed for protection and as reported in the November 2013 report to the security council between June and November . UNMISS deployed a total of 127 civilian field missions and 130 integrated teams of civilian and military personnel to monitor protection issues across the country, and conducted 37 training sessions on rule of law issues 27 training courses on human rights and 323 training courses for the National Police Service on protection of civilian issues (Report of the Secretary General ON South Sudan, 2013).

As of May 2015 the strength of the military component stood at 10,984 comprising infantry troops, enablers, staff officers and military liaison officers. It is headquartered in the South Sudanese capital Juba. As part of the overall engagement with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, UNMISS conducted classes at the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Staff College on the Principles of the United Nations and Peacekeeping for 50 Officers at the Level of Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier General . As at August 2015 the police component stood at 1030 from 42 member states .Registration of the South Sudan National Police Service was completed with the names of a total of 46,427 officers entered into an electronic database. The database figures have been reconciled with the payroll and the process for removing over 11,000 ghost workers from the system.

A large part of the State building rhetoric in South Sudan emphasised the need to bring government to the people; supporting local autonomy needs while enabling effective service delivery through decentralisation. For UNMISS this was operationalised through the Country support bases (CSB).Prior to the outbreak of violence in December 2013, UNMISS had established 35 CSBS throughout the country with the aim to strengthen local governance presence and capacity at the country level through the co-location of UNMISS staff with country authorities and to facilitate a greater presence of UN agencies and development partners (Diana,etal 2013). The mission’s CSB program drew directly from the mission’s budget. Given South Sudan’s exceptionally sparse road network and narrow construction window between rainy seasons, the planned rollout of 19 bases n the mission’s first year was ambitious and aggressive. Several key dimensions of Mission operations including engineering capacity needed for military use and limited monthly flight hours for special field missions were impacted by the high opportunity costs of the CSB program.

The scales of what took place in December 2013 caught UNMISS by surprise. UNMISS was aware of the crisis following the split between the president Kiir and former deputy Machar,the timing speed of the conflict was not foreseen. There appears to have been little contingency planning and the mission was left unprepared for conflict. In respect of not been prepared, UNMISS responded by opening up a number of its bases to civilians fleeing the conflict. UNMISS provided protection to over 206,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) at five POC sites (IOM, 2015). This protection has been absorbing approximately 40% of UNMISS resources. The mission also carried out some air and ground patrols, albeit limited, the protection of Civilian Sites (POC). These forced many to leave their homes when the violence broke out to UNMISS bases in Juba (Central Equatoria State) Bor (Jonglei State) Malakal (Upper Nile State)

Bentiu (Unity State) and Wau (Western Bahral Ghazal State). These sites ,some of which have subsequently been relocated to nearby areas due to the need to increase the space for those seeking protection and to allow space for other mission operations have now effectively become IDP camps.

5. INDIA'S PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN AFRICA

Since achieving its independence 70 years ago, India has continually participated in UN peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world, and in various capacities. A significant number of these commitments have been undertaken in Africa. As India's interests in Africa have expanded over the past two decades, the provision of blue helmets has been a prominent feature on its engagement with the continent and a key component of its effort to strengthen India-Africa relations. India extended its participation in UN peacekeeping mission ever since UN involved itself in Conflict management situation in Africa. India's support in peacekeeping operations in Africa demonstrates its commitment at bringing peace and development to the continent (Gurirab, 2000).

At present, it is the third largest troop contributing Country (TPCC) in the world (United Nations Peacekeeping 2015). Kumar (2010) argues that this massive participation in international peacekeeping indicates Delhi's inclusion of peacemaking capabilities in its foreign policy doctrine .In fact, within the country these are the three broad historical reasons often cited to explain India's participation in peacekeeping operations: the size of its armed forces, lack of such forces in other part of the newly decolonized world and influence in world affairs through its role in the Non Aligned Movement (Thakur and Banerjee,2003).

As part of its commitment to international peace and security written in the Indian constitution under Article 51 (Part IV) along with a long term foreign policy commitment to supporting the process of decolonization, India has increasingly participated in peacekeeping operations. However it is important to note here that Indian participation in peacekeeping has been overwhelmingly within the UN framework with the exception of the bilateral peacekeeping mission to Sri Lanka in 1987. Used as a foreign policy tool, international peacekeeping missions were thus used by India to establish solidarity and better relations with newly decolonized countries and maintain an influential position and leading role within the Non-Aligned Movement.

The adoption of Non Alignment as a tool for foreign policy and for conceptualizing international relations is evident in India's participation in peacekeeping missions. Having gained independence before many other nations in Asia and Africa, "India made it a foreign policy priority to support freedom for other colonies (Banerjee, 2003). The commitment of India to her foreign policy goals of peace and justice one can posit is quite in line with the UN same principles that were enshrined in the United Nations Charter (Srivastava, 1994).

Since the participation in United Nations peacekeeping has been accorded a high priority in Indian foreign policy. Recent debates show there is an increasing trend towards the participation in peacekeeping to fulfil international political aspirations. Competition with economically advanced countries like Germany and Japan to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is often cited as a reason to improve India's international credibility through participation in

UNPKO (Krishnasamy, 2010). It is also seen as a tool to improve bilateral and multilateral relations (Nambiar, 2011). India is not only a relatively stable democracy, but also a rising economic power with a sense of 'manifest destiny' and its peacekeeping profile is a major component of its bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

5.1 India's Contribution's to UN Peacekeeping Operation South Sudan

India's political relations with South Sudan also progressed during the CPA. Indian President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed had visited the region in December 1975 (Indian Express 2011). However 30 years later there was a significant political visit from India to Southern Sudan. In 2005, the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Shri Ahmed who represented India at CPA signing led an 18-member business delegation to meet with the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) leadership in Juba (India Ministry of External Affairs, 2006). India opened a consulate General in Juba in October 2007 and sought to expand its human resource development links (the USP [unique selling point] of India with Southern Sudan. In the lead-up to the January 2011 referendum, a senior Indian official in Sudan called for a timely credible and transparent vote in which the popular will of southerners would be respected (Large et al, 2014).

After the yes vote, a Government of South Sudan minister (GOSS) visited India to encourage co-operation. In March 2012, the Ministry of External Affairs appointed a special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan. This position was later given to P.S.Raghavan, also the special secretary for the Development Partnership Administration, the body managing India's international development partnerships (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2013). This articulated India's position for a speedy resolution to the conflict and offers South Sudan several capacity-building and infrastructural projects.

India has provided human and financial peacekeeping resources to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and as of May 2015, was the largest troop-contributing country with 2,267 troops (UNMISS News, 2015). They deployed in two of the largest states in South Sudan – Jonglei and Upper Nile. Additionally, there is a Police component of 37 Indian police officers who have been assisting the South Sudan National Police Service in building up the police structures and a number of civilian officials are in various other departments of UNMISS (UNMISS News, 2015). Significantly the scope of this commitment, it is important to note that UNMISS is one of the UN's largest peacekeeping missions, after deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Darfur region of Sudan. Since the start of the civil war in South Sudan, a notable number of Indian soldiers have been injured or lost their lives. Seven soldiers were killed in the first year alone (Gettleman, 2013).

The Indian contingent largely constitutes medical corps, engineering units and supply corps which have been vital to running a mission in a new country with almost no existing infrastructure. Indian contingent have not shield away from robust peacekeeping and have played an important role in protecting the mass of civilians fleeing from violence. The most recent example is when the UN's Protection of Civilian camps came under heavy attack in Malakal and Pibor; the Indian battalion played a vital role in protecting the thousands of civilians seeking shelter there (Puroht, 2016). However UNMISS has not been able to provide a lasting solution to an increasingly brutal and ethnicized civil war with political parties unwilling to relinquish control armed groups (Hutton, 2014). This has given room for regional and external actors to

take over the mediation process through forums like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in which India has not participated.

Apart from performing operational duties, Indian Contingents (INDCON) units at various times discovered that in order to win the hearts and minds of the populace within their Area of Responsibility (AOR) and ameliorate the sufferings of the people were going through as a result of the war, it was necessary to carry out some humanitarian projects. These they were able to do, by contributing some money from their allowances to finance projects identified to be of paramount importance to the inhabitants.

Some of the projects executed included: India Army contingent and the Malakal based joint integrated unit (JIU) joined forces on 19th May 2016 to plant 45 trees inside the Upper Nile University compound. They have assisted Upper Nile University in a number of ways ranging from the donation of books and the organization of academic exhibitions to the provision of veterinary education. Indian Army contingent built bridges from Malakal town and the airport from the protection site. This helped in the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians at the Malakal UNMISS base in Upper Nile State. In January 2016, the Indian Battalion Doctors (INDBATT) operating in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) base of Melut organised a veterinary camp for the livestock.

The UN Mission in South Sudan has expressed admiration for the significant work performed by Indian doctors who treated hundreds of patients and provided assistance to civilians seeking protection from fighting between government forces (Embassy of India Newsletter, 2016). Indian doctors stationed at UN mission bases in South Sudan have been recognized for providing critical healthcare services; including helping deliver babies, amid the conflict and violence (Embassy of India Newsletter, 2016). They provided medical services to IDPs living in the POC sites and to residents of the larger community. The medical staff performed over 1000 surgeries offered other services.

6. CONCLUSION

India is seen as one of the most dependable and active supporter of UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world. Africa has a special emotional significance for Indian troops which has won great compliments from the international community and host community. India's cultural, religious and linguistic variety has helped Indian forces to deal effectively with African societies comprising different tribes. The Indian contingent put in their best in South Sudan and worked hard to win the hearts and minds of the people. Through humanitarian services the Indian experience in UNMISS was unpleasent with the loss of Indian peacekeepers. But India still remains committed to the cause of UN peacekeeping in maintaining peace and security. It has not slackened in its traditional support of UN peacekeeping.

For Effectiveness and good output Indian peacekeeping missions will achieve high efficiency and good outcomes if it adopts a strategic approach to peacekeeping. It involves recognizing that peacekeeping missions alone cannot solve political stalemates and conflicts. In order for its success, there is the need for India to cooperation with major powers and regional partners like the African Union. She should go beyond troop contribution in provide training, logistical and

operational support. It will also need to expand domestic defence capabilities and strengthen military diplomacy.

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