

## Political Culture of Violence in Developing Democracies

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### Abstract

*Violence inhibits growth, development and democratic sustenance of any country in the world. Violence has its culture with definite structures through which it operates in different climes. This structure enables it to continually manifest in such community. The political structure of violence is referred to as a 'virus genome' in this paper. The genome is a compound complex structure. This genome in all communities allows violence to strive amidst of all political, social, economic and institutional measures. How can the political culture and structure of violence be broken? Qualitative research method is used to obtain data. Relative deprivation theory is applied in explaining the root cause of violence in the society. This paper revealed that political culture of violence in developing democracies and developed alike has its origin which is traceable to bad governance and the deprivation of the people of their common good. In order to break the political culture and structure of violence, good governance and prompt policy actions are inevitable.*

**Keywords:** Democracies, Good Governance, Insecurity, Relative Deprivation, Violence, Virus Genome.

### Introduction

Violence of all forms and kinds is an anomaly to governments all over the world. It is often seen as both ancient and modern challenges with multivariate dimensions. The extent of violence in various countries may vary due to various peculiarities prevailing in such political environment. The depth of violent occurrence is related to the level of political and economic developments in such country. A developed country has its peculiar level of violence so also the developing countries. The paradox of violence in most polities is that the more developed the polity is, the complex the extent of violence therein. Also, the level of undeveloped a country is, the more dynamic and reoccurring its level of violence might be.

The dimensions to which violence inclined in both ancient and modern times can be simply categorised into three - political, economic and social. However, there is no clear consensus among scholars as regarding the manifestations of violence in different dimensions among states. Some claim a variation while others claim a typology (Goldsmith 2015; Rolandsen and Anderson 2015). In the view of Moser and Meilwaine (2004 and 2006) they categorized violence into four main types; political, institutional, economic and social violence which are present in both developed and developing countries and or democracies.

Developing democracies are the class of states in the world which have the potential of growing from their present redundant states of institutional status to a more robust political economic structure. In such countries, the executive, legislature, judiciary and the mass media institutions are all present as in all other democracies but the level of their operations and functionalities are weak, poor, solitary and most times rudimental (Aluko, 2017). The extent of violence in developing democracies is most potent and revolves in chain streaks. This does not mean that violence is not present in other countries especially in developed democracies. Violence is a political genetic crisis predominantly found in any form of political system or governmental arrangements adopted by any country of the world. That is to say, the reason for ubiquity of violence in all countries of the world is that there are political genetics in all system that clones, provoke and instigate violence.

Violence genome is therefore a classified socio-political and economic trait present in every human relations and societies. The community gene that coat for violence is a virus that is so potent and it thrives in all forms of political and socio-economic circumstances in the country. The virus genome that coat for violence in the community has a complex compound structure which makes it fairly impossible to eradicate. It consists of six (6) elements and at the centre is the nucleus which has four electrons. The elements revolving around the nucleus are connected to the nucleus by a connective fibre which is held in shape by double bond chains. The elements are also connected together to one another by connective fibres which are held in shape by either the double bond chains or the single bond chains.

Can violence be eradicated in human communities? If no, how can it be reduced and to what extent? This paper argues that the occurrence of violence in a country has a political culture backing it manifestations. The political culture of violence may be strong or weak depending on the extent of good governance in such country. The political culture of violence breeds a structure called the 'violence virus gene' or simply put, virus genome in every community especially the developing democracies. Violence is referred to as virus because of its multiple operational complexities. This therefore makes very it difficult to eradicate but rather managed or minimised. In other to analyse the political culture and structure of violence, the paper thematically considers the conceptual clarification of violence, the theoretical framework of relative deprivation as a root course of violence, the complexity and manifestations of violence in developing countries, the political structure (virus genome) of violence in developing democracies, dimension of urban violence in developing democracies and the conclusion.

### Conceptual Clarification

Violence is a ubiquitous concept in social sciences. It has various connotations. Harroff-Tavel (2010) posited that violence is purely a criminal activity perpetuated to achieve an end. He mentioned different forms of violence including social and political uprising, hunger, riots, identity-based violence among ethnic or religious groups and clashes between territorial gangs, terrorism and acts of



xenophobic violence directed against migrants. This is usually done in an organized and calculated manner.

Gurr (1970) opined that violence is a complex phenomenon which has other forms and they are categorised as; Turmoil— low scale violence such as relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions. Conspiracy—a medium scale violence such as highly organized political violence with limited participation, including organized political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coup d'états and mutinies. Internal war—a higher scale violence such as highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, and revolution

In the opinion of Kunkeler and Peters (2011), violence is generally interpreted and classified as criminal activities. Within a context of state failure or the inability of state representatives to provide security, it can be inferred that fear is a psychological dimension of violence. Akinwale and Aderinto (2013) agreed that all forms of violence in any areas constitute a serious social problem irrespective of their nomenclatures. Therefore, any form of violence that constitutes a threat to security of lives and property of a large number of people in an area is considered as violence.

In another study, Aliyu, Kasim and Martin (2011) and Aluko (2018) expressed violence in terms of ethnic and religious conflicts. Also, Penglase (2011) argued that representations of violence are often centred upon concerns with transgression to the societal social structure, organization, norms and conducts. This might be socio-political or economical in nature. Krause, Muggah and Gilgen (2011) distinguished direct and indirect forms of violence. A direct form results in physical and psychological harm including intentional fatalities, assault and sexual violence. The indirect manifestations negatively affect other aspects of livelihoods, social relations and wellbeing. The trends of violence in general have its origin from relative deprivation of a group of people in either the urban area or the rural area who in turn foment trouble in the country. This implies that when people's right had been deprived for a period of time, it gets to an unbearable threshold or limit of proportionality which will provoke violent reactions against the subject and of the deprivation

### **Theoretical Framework**

Relative deprivation theory guided this study. It is the underlining factor that endangers peace and instigates violence. Relative deprivation is a theory that was born out of feelings and perceptions of individuals and groups' unjust treatment when compared with other groups. These unjust treatments lead to agitations. If the agitations are not properly addressed by the relevant authorities, it will lead to protest which could be violent protest (destruction or 'vandalisation' of properties) and some other societal melee such as kidnapping among others. The theory was first articulated by Stouffer and his group (Stouffer et al 1949) to explain feelings of

satisfaction among various personnel in different cadre in the army. The main premise of relative deprivation theory is that people generally experience dissatisfaction and resentment when their own outcomes do not match the outcomes of other people with whom they compare (Gurr, 1970; Cook, Crosby & Hennigan, 1977; Martin, 1981). For Walker and Smith (2002), the emergence of deprivation feelings is the result of comparative judgments, rather than being determined by objective outcome. Once the comparativeness is unfavourable, there is a tendency of mild scuffling and later escalates into large scale violence if the object of deprivation is not resolved.

Gurr (1970) and Crosby (1976) refer to Relative Deprivation as the tension that develops from a discrepancy between what 'ought to be' and the 'what is' obtainable of collective value satisfaction which disposes men to violence. This implies that 'Relative Deprivation' is the discrepancies between what people want; their value expectations, what they actually gain and their value accruing capabilities. Therefore, the intensity of relative deprivation varies in terms of the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities. People will revolt and become violent when they lose hope of attaining their societal values amidst frustration with depression and inflation. This is true for most violent groups such as the Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, Fulani herdsmen, Shi'ite Muslim sects, political and ethnic militias found across the world.

Gurr asserts that ethnicity and religion are the obvious basis for mobilizing oppression and oppositions against the state. This implies that, the higher the degree of frustration, the greater the rate of violence fomented which results into political instability. Esman (1994) therefore supports the assertion that the gap between a group's prospects and current status and what appear to be reasonable and legitimate expectations leads to agitations and violence if it is unattainable. The violence becomes stronger if other similar comparable groups are believed to enjoy what is available in material, cultural, and political satisfactions at the expense of others.

When taking a closer look at the different ways in which the value of one's outcomes can be assessed, a basic distinction can be made between interpersonal comparisons and intergroup comparisons. Unfavourable interpersonal comparisons may result in feelings of individual deprivation, the violent symptom could be rage and rape among other assaults. While unfavourable intergroup comparisons may lead people to act of vandalism, kidnapping and other socio-political mishaps. This is an important distinction because egoistical (individual) and fraternal (group level) deprivation are predicted to have fundamentally different behavioural consequences (Tyler and Lind 2002). Fraternal deprivation is seen as an important precursor of political protest and intergroup social conflict, while the experience of egoistical deprivation has been associated with social isolation and individual maladjustment. A critique of this view of relative deprivation, however, is that it does not specify the circumstances under which people are likely to interpret their situation as individuals.

In the view of Tougas and Beaton (2002) relative deprivation as personal and group deprivation is the experience of the advantageous group acting against the interest of the disadvantaged group. This may be against the advantaged group's



personal interest or group interest. Relative Deprivation had also been used to address gender disparity and protests. Crosby, Ozawa and Crosby (2002) opined that countries that are essentially individualistic such as Americans will easily implement the affirmative action to remedy gender relative deprivation while countries that are collectivistic such as Japan will hardly implement the gender relative deprivation to remedy of affirmative action.

Relative deprivation theory also explains the reason behind the incessant violence in the developing democracies. Ethnic chauvinism, favouritism and nepotism of the dominant groups over other smaller groups are most causes of this continuous violence. This breeds a political culture of violence and suspicion among the country members. The political largesse and economic gains meant for all the groups in the country will be diverted by the strong fraternal groups at the expense of other groups. These will eventually result into rancour, acrimony and violence initiated by the non-benefiting groups. Also, the result of long-time relative deprivation against the common goods brings about coalition of smaller groups. This coalition gives them an edge to compete with the big ethnic groups and as a result the frequent reoccurring of violence or simply put, the culture of violence is inevitable. By interpolation, violence genome has its bases from relative deprivation of individuals or group of people in the society. Whenever relative deprivation is removed or reduced from the political system, violence will be drastically reduced because the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people will be satisfied.

### **Complexities of Violence in Developing Democracies – Nigeria**

The notion of violence in developing democracies has a changing complexity and manifestations. However, urban areas are the developed areas in the society where high and sophisticated technologies are deployed to curb unlawful acts easily and the reoccurrence are usually nipped in the bud. The complexity is that violence defiles the high standards technologies in such areas and in fact it occurs in a repeated manner with little solutions to curb it especially in developing democracies (Turshen 2015; Aluko, Isiaq and Aremu 2018). The complexity of violence manifests in the various hydra headed shapes it has in its occurrence and effects on the community. It is so complex that as a trend is submerged by the government another new style from the old stalk is being replicated. The policies adopted in the various regions in the country seem to be unique to each state as it is inadequate to curtail the same menace with the same strategy or policy in other areas of developing democracies (Aremu 2014). The enigma will be more prominent whenever various forms of urban violence are taking place at the same time in different part of the country. The following are some of the changing complexities of violence in developing democracies;

#### **Kidnapping**

The kidnapping is a form of man-stealing phenomenon. This melee has gained ascendancy in developing democracies. This malaise previously unknown to the people has rapidly been domesticated. Davidson (2010) illustrates it as a group of criminals armed with guns and cell phones who apprehends unsuspected victims and

drags their victim into a secluded spot and begins to make phone calls to whomever to demand for a ransom. Ngwama (2014), explains literally the word kidnap as being derived from "kid" meaning; child and "nab" which means; to snatch. Adewale (2009) pointed out that kidnapping now appears to be an emerging concern in developing democracies though it is not a new phenomenon. It is as old as the word itself. But the motive may vary from country to country.

Not only does kidnapping inflict psychology violence on the direct victims and their families, it also spreads a fear that hinders direct economic investment in the area where such evils are perpetuated. This in the short and long term leads to decline economic productivity, increase in unemployment rate and a threat to the government's efforts in wooing investors into the country. Ngwama (2014) noted some socio-economic factors facilitating kidnapping in developing democracies (Nigeria) include the following; leadership failure, poor security system, work place insecurity, threat to industrial harmony, unemployment and destabilisation of labour market. The complexity in kidnapping is that it could take the form of political, economic or social-religious. It could be all in some other climes. Political kidnapping could be during electioneering period while the other forms could be at any point in time. However, the aim is to inflict hardship on perceived targets.

### **Gang Violence**

The urban areas have been a site of constant struggles where various socio-political groups in the state and local communities converge to get a means for survival. The scale of violence witnessed in developing democracies in the 1990s till date is a source of worry to the international community (Badmus, 2009). This is because of the emergence of social movements that were at the forefront of resistance against exploitation and relative deprivations. Prominent among these movements in Nigeria and other African states are the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA) (Atere, and Akinwale, 2006 and Badmus, 2009).

Aluko, (2018) opined that the activities of these groups have negative impacts on the state despite the fact that they have been able to place their demands on the country and became popular beyond their shores. The Ogoni resistance, championed by MOSOP, is interwoven around the struggles against environmental degradation and social marginalization. The Ijaw ethnic group struggles is centred on perceived state suppression and socioeconomic marginalization. The rise of Ijaw struggles was coincided with the seemingly decline of the Ogoni resistance following execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others in direct state repression of the Ogoni in Nigeria. Gang violence complexity is visible in the aim it tends to achieve. These could be to achieve political ends, economic motives and or social status.

### **Terrorism**

This is the height of armed group violent activities. Armed groups have increased their use of violent tactics over the past year in the form of kidnappings,



battles with security forces, inter-group clashes with one another, car bombs and indiscriminate killing and general attacks on perceived soft target which is a more recent tactic. Such groups are mostly a product of relative deprivation which leads to separatist agitation and they have demonstrated increasingly the use of sophisticated tactics and weaponry, raising concerns about future violence. They are creating conditions conducive for escalation of violence (Hazen and Horner, 2007).

The terrorism levels in developing countries have incapacitated and render helpless the government, particularly with the bombing activities of the Boko Haram Sect and the Fulani militias in Nigeria and other countries in West Africa (Amnesty International, 2011 and Omilusi 2013). The raise of terrorist groups in the Middle East and Far East is a worrisome crisis in developing countries. The governments and the elite are unable to tackle the terrorist groups single-handedly. This had aid their transformation into a terrorist organization. Not only is the sect on rampage and the governments clueless, the problem has reached a point where the authorities are 'sadly and shamelessly' pleading for dialogue. Terrorism variability in complexity is visible in the aim it tends to achieve. These could be towards political ends, economic motives and or social status.

### **Dimension of Violence in Developing Democracies**

The dimensions to urban violence in both ancient and modern times can be simply categorised into three. These are: the political violence, the economic violence and the social violence. However, Bernault & Deutsch (2015) and de Bruijn, Bouju, Studiecentrum (2015) had different perspectives to the dimensions of violence but there is still some consensus in their various opinions. Moser and Mcilwaine (2004; 2006) have categorized violence into four main types; political, institutional, economic and social violence. Any new class of institutional violence can be seen as a derivation of any of the three fundamentals inclusion in any society; the political institution, economic and social institutions. However, it is unique to carefully segregate it from the parent genome so as to give a dimension of an organized violence which has the inclusion of the three parents almost at the same time.

Aluko, Isiaq and Aremu (2018) noted that political violence is seen as the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power in the society. These include the following manifestations; Guerrilla conflict, paramilitary conflict, political assassinations, armed conflict between political parties among others. Economic Violence is the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire which may be conscious or unconscious for economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power in the society. It manifests in various ways as street crime, carjacking, robbery/theft, drug trafficking, kidnapping, assaults including killing and rape made during economic crimes.

Social Violence may be seen as the violent acts motivated by a desire, which may be conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain and or maintain social power in the society. The manifestations vary but can be captured in the following ways; inter personal violence such as between spouses, child abuse, sexual assault of

women and children, arguments that get out of control such as traditional ownership of land, right to perform a traditional rite such as festivals which gets out of hand leading to community upheaval among others. Social (religious or and ethnic) cleansing by civil vigilante groups, lynching of suspected criminals by community members (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004).

Institutional violence is motivated by a desire to consciously or unconsciously exercise institutional power at individual or collective levels over other groups and individuals. Its manifestations include the following; violence perpetrated by state 'political institutions' such as the army and police as well as government ministries such as health and education among others. Examples include; Extra-judicial killings by police, physical or psychological abuse by health and educational institution workers, state or community vigilante-directed social cleansing of gangs and street children, lynching of suspected criminals by community police or Army members. The table two (2) below summarises the dimension of violence.

**Table 2: Dimensions of violence in urban areas**

Category Of Violence	Types Of Violence By Perpetrators and/or Victims	Manifestations
<b>Political</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State and non-state violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guerrilla conflict</li> <li>• Paramilitary conflict</li> <li>• Political assassinations</li> <li>• Armed conflict between political parties</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organized crime</li> <li>• Business interests</li> <li>• Delinquents</li> <li>• Robbers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intimidation and violence as means of resolving economic disputes</li> <li>• Street theft, robbery and crime</li> <li>• Kidnapping</li> <li>• Armed robbery</li> <li>• Drug-trafficking</li> <li>• Car theft &amp; other contraband activities</li> <li>• Small-arms dealing</li> <li>• Assaults including killing and rape in the course of economic crimes</li> <li>• Trafficking in prostitutes</li> <li>• Conflict over scarce resources</li> </ul>
<b>Economic/social</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gangs</li> <li>• Street children (boys and girls)</li> <li>• Ethnic violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Territorial or identity-based "turf" violence; robbery, theft</li> <li>• Petty theft</li> <li>• Communal riots</li> </ul>
<b>Social</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intimate partner violence inside the home</li> <li>• Sexual violence (including rape) in the public arena</li> <li>• Child abuse: boys and girls</li> <li>• Inter-generational conflict between parent and children</li> <li>• Gratuitous/routine daily violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Physical or psychological male-female abuse</li> <li>• Physical and sexual abuse, particularly prevalent in the case of stepfathers but also uncles</li> <li>• Physical and psychological abuse</li> <li>• Incivility in areas such as traffic, road rage, bar fights and street confrontations</li> <li>• Arguments that get out of control</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violence of state and other</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extra-judicial killings by police</li> </ul>



	'informal' institutions • Including the organised private sector	Physical or psychological abuse by health and education workers • State or community vigilante-directed social cleansing of gangs and street children • Lynching of suspected criminals by community members
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Source: Adapted from Moser and McIlwaine (2006); Researchers' update 2018

From the above complexities and dimensions of violence occurrence in the society, it is evident that violence has a political culture. The culture of violence however operates in specific structures. It is therefore imperative to understand the structure of violence and why it has the potential of reoccurring in any human societies. The inevitable occurrence is due to its active genome which is has high rate of replication like a virus at any time.

### THE STRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES (THE 'VIRUS GENOME' OF VIOLENCE)




Figure I. The 'Virus Genome' of Violence<sup>1</sup>  
 Source: Author

<sup>1</sup> Also called; Aluko Democracy Crises Transport Chain (ADCTC)

The virus genome that coats violence in the community is a compound complex structure. It consists of six (6) elements and at the centre is the nucleus which has four electrons. The elements revolving around the nucleus and are connected to the nucleus by a connective fibre which is held in shape by double bond chains. The elements are also connected together to one another by connective cords which are held in shape by either the double bond chains or the single bond chains. The pillars of violence (cytoplasm material) present in the virus genome of any community and especially a developing democracy are the Insurgency (I) element, Neo-colonialism (NC) element, One Party Government (OPG) element, Military Rule (MR) element, kidnapping (K) elements and Failed States (FS) elements. The foundation material (nucleus) of the virus genome is the Crises Democracy. The component of the foundation materials (nuclei materials) are referred to as the crises electrons which are the Political, Economical, Social and Spiritual crises (PESS crises electrons).

The starting point is the centre, the crises democracy (Figure I). The Democracy in Crises Transport Chain (will be simply referred to as DC transport chain) is a multi facet input and output source with a bilateral directional movement that shows the output transport of societal abnormalities as a result of constant inward transport of fragmented crises electrons; the Political, Economical, Social and Spiritual crises (PESS crises electrons). All the outward elements (Insurgency, Neo-colonialism, One Party Government, Military rule, kidnapping and failed states) has the PESS crises electrons of which all may be present in one output. All the output electrons may be present in a single country (field).

DC is a field which has charged elements around it. Each element has it electrons around it. It has six double bonds with the surrounding elements in it field. Each element is bonded together with either single bound or double bond. The six bonds connecting the elements together are two double bonds and four single bonds. The double bonds are situated from K element to I element and from OPG element to MR element. The single bonds are from FS element to K element, I element to NC element, NC element to OPG element and MR element to FS element. Each element transmits the PESS electrons to the Compound DC. When DC field gets charged up, it transmits back in any of the elements directions depending on the elements that has the presence of highest concentration of electron charges in the compound DC field.

However, whenever compound DC transmits back the output abnormally which is also seen as political anomaly, it has the capability to transmit electrons to one another through their connecting bonds. With this clockwise transmission, there are tendencies of changing of form of occurrence of the anomaly to the new one which received the full charges from the previous elements PESS crises electrons. The only condition of anticlockwise transport of the PESS crises electron is the presence of double bonds. After the reverser transport, the electrons continue on either the clockwise or the anticlockwise transport chain so as to transform into the next element.

Whenever the anticlockwise transport occurs, the only factor that prevents a reverser transport is the level of saturation of the previous political anomaly element.



If the level of saturation of the clockwise is greater than the anticlockwise transport, due to sensitisation of its manifestation in the society, the anticlockwise transport is overcome and the clockwise onward transport continues. This may be altered by a new outward forceful transport of electrons charges when the DC compound field is fully saturated. The PESS crises electron transports are both towards the DC compound and at the same time across the field in a clockwise direction towards the other anomaly element.

### **Analysing the Transport Chain of the Violence 'Virus Genome'**

The transport chain of violence in a political system operates with a genome. It is referred to as virus genome because it is difficult to get rid of it just like a virus and it has the potential of spreading rapidly. This genome is made up of certain six elements. Each six elements have four electrons that help in the transportation of the elements. The rate of saturation of any of the element in the political system results into its resultant violence typical to the saturated element.

### **Starting point**

All the six elements which are the Failed State (FS) element, the Kidnapping (K) element, the Insurgency (I) element, the Neo-Colonialism (NC) element, One Party Government (OPG) element and Military Regime (MR) element are in active states in all countries. Their rate of transports depends on the environmental factors propelling it in such country. They therefore transport their Political, Economical, Social and Spiritual (PESS) crises electrons through the bonds in a linear order into the Democracy in Crises Compound field. The factor that kept the electrons to move in linear order is the force of the DC compound field. So far all the six elements transmit their PESS electrons into the DC compound, the factor that warrant the resultant output of the political anomaly is the rate of concentration and saturation of the individual electrons within the DC compound.

The rate of transport of the electrons into the DC compound is conditioned by environmental factors. For example, if the society is heated up using any of the PESS crises electrons by a group of actor (people), the nature of the group will determine the outcome of the transport effect. If the actor-group is militant in nature for instance the Boko Haram Islamist extremists in Nigeria, the Niger Delta Ethnic militia groups among others the Democracy in Crises can lead to Insurgency or Kidnapping. If the actor-groups are military personnel, just like the military coups that ended the first, second and third republics in Nigeria, the Democracy in Crises can lead to Military rule or One Party Government. If it is instigated by selfish capitalist groups the Democracy in Crises can lead to Neo-Colonialism or One party Rule. If the group instigating the electron transports is multi facet, the Democracy in Crises can lead to a failed state or any of the abnormal political elements.

### **Stage two**

Immediately there is a saturation of the DC compound, there is an outward transport of the replica electrons that constitute the saturation point within the DC

compound through a forceful counter transport caused by the forceful random collision forces of the PESS crises electrons. This moves back along the double bonds that transport it inwardly into the DC compound. This implies that whenever the crises electron of any of the six elements for instance insurgency reaches a saturation point in the political system ahead of other elements, insurgent groups will spring up in the country.

Saturation point can be reached whenever the relevant government authority neglects the demands, needs or yearning of the people for a long time in a particular location. For instance, the neglect of the Niger Delta development in Nigeria led to various violent groups that kidnap and vandalise government and private multinational properties. Also the neglect of the educational and infrastructural needs of the 'almagiri's' in the northern Nigeria which in turn gave rise to Boko Haram terrorist insurgency.

### **Stage three**

Depending on the environmental factor(s) that caused the rapid transport of PESS crises electrons that led to the over saturation point of the DC compound; if the outward forceful counter transport leads to kidnapping anomaly, the prevailing crises in the community will be kidnapping of any form or dimension. If it is not interrupted by another forceful reversal transport within the DC polity, there is a continuous flow of PESS crises electron to the other less saturated anomaly element.

This implies that whenever an element is in saturation be it Kidnapping or others, it remains prevalent until other element gets to its saturation and over shadows the manifestation and dominance of the initial one. For instance, kidnapping may be in prevalence for a while but when terrorism becomes saturated, it takes over the stage of dominance and prompts manifestations.

### **Stage four**

In cases where there is a double bond, the transport from the clockwise direction also has the tendency of reversing back after it had gotten to the next anomaly element. However, due to the level of saturation of the previous anomaly element, the double bond reversal process is overcome and the new level becomes stabilised with the new anomaly element. Also, this transport can be altered by the forceful reversal transport within the DC polity so as to start from another anomaly element entirely.

This implies that the double bond is a two-way flow channel. If the saturated flows round the cytoplasm of the genome (round the country), it could be reversed when it gets to another region due to the presence of a prevailing element. However, if the initial element is more saturated it cannot be reversed. For instance, there were kidnapping in the Central and Northern states in Nigeria but this was submerged by the insurrection of Fulani Herdsmen militia and Boko Haram terrorist groups respectively. This is the double bond two-way flow channel of virus genome of violence in a society.



**Stage five**

In cases of multiple forceful reversal transport within the DC polity into the bonds of the anomaly elements, the result can be a failed state element. This means that if there are multiple saturations of the elements simultaneously, there will be multiple effects of violence in the different regions of the country and it could lead to state of emergency and subsequently a state failure. That is to say, in a country where there are uncontrollable and prevalence of Insurgency, Neo-colonialism, One Party Government, kidnapping and or Military rule, it can lead to a state of emergency declaration and subsequently failed state.

**Extra Transport factors:**

These are some of the prominent factors that affect and conditions the transport of elements and their constituent PESS electrons in the DC field-political system; a. *dependence on externalities*, b. *selective regimes* c. *suspension of the constitution* d. *porous security*

(a) There is an extra transport element in the transport of PESS crises electron from Insurgency (I) element to Neo-Colonialism (NC), which is the *dependence on externalities*. This might definitely help the country witnessing DC but it will be with some strings attached. The conditions attached will lead to reduction in sovereignty of the state and Neo-Colonialism will set in. A situation where by externalities becomes the controller of the polity directly by their physical presence or indirectly by using the indigenous rulers. For instance, a country that depends on the donor agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund among other or over reliance on the military capability of an allied country, such country will operate under their conditionality and this will reduce the sovereignty of such country.

(b) There is an extra transport element in the transport of PESS crises electron from Neo-Colonialism (NC) to One Party Government (OPG), which is the *selective regime*. The neo-colonialism will create a lopsided government which will only cater for the 'elite powers' who are controlling the administrative means of production and distribution of goods and services. The whole masses in the polity will be at the mercy of the group(s) controlling the government. This will eventually commutate into a one party government. Such is seen if a group of people are controlling the core economic life of the country and as well if a person is the sole financial of a political party.

(c) In the transport of PESS crises electron from Military Rule (MR) to Failed State (FS), there is an extra transport element which is the *suspension of the constitution*. As a result of military rule, the suspension of the constitution element becomes inevitable. This aids the free practice of lawlessness of state of nature practice, recklessness in handling the economic goods and services and worthlessness of human lives in the polity. The eventual result in the polity is the failed state element. This is a situation where by everyone is for himself but God is for all in the polity.

This was a replica in the civil war in Nigeria, genocide in Rwanda, war in Syria and other wars or civil war outbreak where the Constitution were suspended.

(d) In the transport of PESS crises electron from Failed State (FS) to Kidnapping (K), there is an extra transport element which is the *porous security (Free Attacks)*. As a result of the failed state symptoms, the extra element of porous security encourages free attacks on perceived enemies in the polity. This will facilitate the kidnapping element in the polity. This is a situation where by people become missing in the community because some personalities had carried them away. This may be for any reasons from the PESS crises electron. In essence, in a failed state, people got missing without trace and no one to be accused for the action due to bad security.

It is important to note that the environmental factors that may conditions the transport of the PESS crises electrons for rapid saturation of the Democratic Crises compound may be unpredictable in the community. However, the relative deprivations of the people of their basic rights make the elements more potent and influence its rapid saturation in the political system. A single external condition may also lead to more than one forceful counter transport of PESS crises electrons to the outcome of any of the elements. This implies that the country with DC syndrome will witness more than one element in operation. This is the situation in most developing countries and developed countries as well.

### Conclusion

Violence indeed constitutes a serious social problem irrespective of their nomenclatures. Violence constitutes a threat to security of lives and property of a large number of people in any geographical location. Developing democratic countries have high rate of turnover of violence than the developed ones. Violence in both developed and developing democracies has a changing sinusoidal complexity. The complexity and dimensions vary and the following are prominent in their occurrence; kidnapping, Terrorism and Gang Violence. The relative deprivation theoretical frame work as used buttresses the fact that when people are deprived of their rights for a period of time they become tensed up and result into agitations, protest and violence may become endemic. Deprivation makes people to result into self willed survival strategy or activities in the society.

There is no country in the world that does not have a measure of violence occurrence. The political culture of violence is evident in various forms and structures. The magnitude or the level of its occurrence may differ from place to place. This means that the foundational content or the elements of violence with their corresponding electrons are present in the political system of any community and especially in both developing and developed democracy. There are presence of either one or more combination of threats such as the Insurgency (I) element, Neo-colonialism (NC) element, One Party Government (OPG) element, Military Rule (MR) element, kidnapping (K) elements and or Failed States (FS) elements with their



corresponding Political, Economical, Social and Spiritual crises (PESS crises electrons).

The various crises across Africa (Somalia, Nigeria), Asia (India, Pakistan), Middle East (Syria, Iran, Iraq), Europe (Ukraine, Russia) among others all have the iota of some or all of Political, Economical, Social and or Spiritual (PESS crises electron) malfunctioning. Political crises instigated bad leadership and public policies will in turn lead to bad governance, poor economic growth which will be favourable to just a group of people other than the entire country. It will also breed bad social melee such as ethno-religious crises, gang culture and other spiritually inclined vices. The summation of all these factors among others will result into typical crises as characterised or facilitate by the crises element.

Therefore, it is pertinent to break the connective fibres of the Aluko Democracy Crises Transport Chain (ADCTC)—‘virus genome’ of violence. A potent measure for this operation is good governance characterised with equality before the law, supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law and separation of power of the various arms of government. Periodic conduct of free, fair and credible election coupled with the equitable distribution of goods and services are also essential to neutralise the PESS electron causing violence. The root causes of violence must be tackled with the appropriate policy statements, actions and implementations so as to reduce the rate of saturation of crises elements in the political system and rate of spontaneous agitation. This will prompt sustained development, harmonious peace and continuous progress in the country. Eventually, this will result into the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people in the country.

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