ROLE OF EDUCATION WHERE ETHNICITY PLAYED MAJOR ROLE: A CASE STUDY OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THAILAND

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Abstract
The issue of conflict is not peculiar to Africa, likewise when it comes to ethnicity rivalry and conflict in which most of the people are not aware. The purpose of this paper is to examine the believe is that it is only an African problem or Black man woe. That is the purpose of this paper to examine the role which ethnicity play in two countries outside Africa, using Yugoslavia and Thailand as a case study. The paper discovered what is common among the black race can also be found among other ethnic groups around the World. Furthermore, other common factors that the paper unearth is that where there is conflict those involved in it always find the means on how the conflict can be resolved either through conventional or traditional mechanisms. An analytical method of research was employed in getting the facts presented in the study. The paper submitted further that ethnic conflict resolution in traditional Yugoslavia and Thailand societies operate within the communal setting rather than that of individuals contradictory to the perception of the Western World. It concluded that the customs and traditions of both parties in the conflict form the basis for the resolution.

Introduction

An ethnic group can be defined as "a segment of a large society whose members are thought, by themselves and or others, to have a common origin and to share important segment of a common culture and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients."[1]

Conflict is a persistent human trend that penetrated all forms of social rapport in all ethnic and cultural groups. From intergroup conflict to interpersonal friction, conflict is often a built-in part of the human relating process. Conflict itself, however is not necessarily a negative or positive trend. It is how we manage conflict that can lead to constructive or destructive outcomes. Conflict is defined in this paper as an intense disparity process between a minimum of two mutually dependent parties when they perceive irreconcilable interests, viewpoints, processes, and or goals in an interface episode.[2] Most relations at the international arena, are regrettably based on conflicts. Conflicts take or happen in different dimensions. We further shall examine the following questions and provide answers to them in order to have a comprehensive outcome of the theme. What is international conflict? What are the yardstick that we can use to measure before classifying a conflict to be an international, regional, or ethnic conflict? We shall also examine two countries, one in Europe and the second one in Asia, where conflicts can be classified as international, regional or ethnic conflicts.

In addition, we shall further trace the historical analysis of the two countries where ethnic conflicts are prevalent. What factors lead to the ethnic conflict? The historical antecedence and scale of the conflicts and the effects. The role of external influence, and how the ethnic conflicts were resolved. We shall further take case studies from two countries, one from Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, while the second one from Southeast Asia, Thailand. These two countries formed the bases of this paper.

We deduced from various scholars, that there are three kinds of ethnic conflicts in the international relations, with two types of patterns. These are pre-modern, modern and post-modern. These kinds of conflicts are believed to have emerged from different, clashing interests. They might be tangible and intangible. It is also a fact that conflicts result as an interest that follow certain patterns connected with society and the impact of certain political interest among the elites. Ethnic conflict first occurred among denominations, and then between clerical and secular interests. The concept of social class [upper, middle and lower] was introduced during these times, which caused another basis for friction. Although, there are three types of ethnic conflicts, the first two, pre-modern and modern, fit into today's major conflicts. They are pre-modern in the sense that religious conflicts

play a large part in today's conflicts, as well as class conflicts. Additionally, ethnic conflicts have a modern aspect due to the idea of the nation-state, and the strong feelings toward this term with hope for independence and perhaps, unity, tie in closing with these modern types of ethnic conflicts. This brings us to another step to explicate what an international conflict mean.

What is International Conflict?

Among the kinds of conflicts mentioned above, there are two patterns of ethnic conflict; international and intra-national. International conflicts are crosscutting conflicts that exist between international borders. This kind of pattern includes possible conflicts between sovereign states in the same region. On a good note, one state claims the role of supporter for an ethnic group within the borders of another state. There are numerous examples. Conflicts in central and Eastern Europe, conflicts between Turkey and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania concerning the Hungarian minority in Transylvanian, and the conflict between Albanian populations; are all examples of international conflicts.

International ethnic conflicts are between ethnic groups within existing borders. Generally, there is no international legal right of interference by another sovereign state that might be claiming the role of ethnic advocate. The negative impact of ethnic conflicts is that it can splinter a state into two or more states. An example of this would be the two multi-ethnic federations, the former USSR and former Yugoslavia. Both had tradition of claiming leading roles, Russians in the case of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Serbs in the case of Yugoslavia. This will be discussed in detail. Another example of international ethnic conflict is the Czechoslovak Republic, which was based purely on a compromise between Czechs and Slovak. The explosion of ethnic conflict within a border has seemed to be more evident when the political unit had successfully claimed independence from the central institution, e.g. Serbian minority in Croatia.

Effects of International Conflicts

There are several reasons why we study international conflicts. This has been attested to by the facts of the repercussion of ethnic conflicts when they are not curtailed it, can transform into international conflicts. First, ethnic conflicts can damage the economic ties between neighbouring states, and grievingly impact regional interests by disrupting trade, transportation, communication and access to raw materials.[3] Second, the international market can be negatively affected by ethnic conflict because investors can no longer safely invest in those insecure states, which are riddle with internal turmoil and thus prone to volatility. Since investment cannot be safeguarded in insecure regions, the lack of foreign capital in turn, can then exacerbate the conflict, as citizens meet their basic needs or

procure food or fuel.[4]

Third, as ethnic conflicts trigger mass exodus to nearby, and distant places, creating new support links, which in turn exacerbate the original conflict, and cause even more migration to occur. This can create an uncontrollable chain of ever-widening involvement of host communities, and new interests in the conflicts[5] Fourth, ethnic groups will resort to terrorism because it is much cheaper and easier to engage in it than conventional military warfare. Finally, ethnic conflict can have an immediate effect on the international system if a state with ethnic strife has nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

In the aftermath of the cold war, processes of democratization in some countries have revealed old ethnic religious and cultural differences that have led to sever ethnic violence and conflicts. The administrative state and institutions of former socialist states, once relieved of central authoritarian leadership diverse claims of constituent ethnic groups.[6] As a result, ethnic cleavage came to the surface, as a threatening of the force that jeopardised the unity of the states. In the explanation of Moynhan, he stated that: the world was entering a period of ethnic stability of the ethnic conflict, following the relative stability of the cold war.[7]

What can be deduced from this is that as large formal structure broke up, and ideology lost its hold, people would regress to more identities that are primal. Therefore, conflict could arise from these identities. Yugoslavia is a good example of this case. Where complexity of a multiethnic society, burdened with historical animosities,. led to conflict and disintegration,[8] and revealed that ethnicity had emerged as a unity. However, explanations of the word conflict by western leaders, such as 'age old antagonisms,' 'ancient hatreds' and Balkan ghosts'[9], are simplistic ones and tend to confront the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a result of old animosities among its groups and attribute the glaring tragedy to the force of ethnicity.

It is argued in this paper that, the conflict between Yugoslavia's ethnic groups was not determined by ethnic groups itself, rather that, ethnicity played a vital role in the issue, as the political elites took advantages of the symbolic power that ethnicity has to offer and used it as a tool for pursuing territorial, political and economic aims. Thus, ethnicities become the basis of political mobilisation in pursuit of resurgent claims to territory and power[10]. In conclusion, ethnicity became politicized, [11]for the exacerbation of nationalism, the manipulation of which was in turn the underlining force of the conflict. Before we go further in analysing the role of ethnicity in Yugoslavia's conflict, we shall define the concepts of ethnicity, ethnic conflict and nationalism. The reason is that these concepts doubtlessly give clear clue to the causes of ethnic conflicts.

The Impact of Ethnicity from the Cradle of State Creation

Yugoslavia came into existence in the aftermath of World War 1, in 1918; as the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes[11] The creation of the new state was based on the concept of ethnicity from the on-set, i.e., that the south Slavs share an ethnicity and they should therefore be in the same state. Yet, the concept ethnicity used at that time to imply only the notion of race and its content was party biological, its essence was language.[12] Thus, it was assumed that people speaking the language were members of the nation and should in accordance be living in the same state. Hence, the south Slavs were all members of one nation. This type of emerge was very common in the 19th century.[13] However, the exclusion emphasis on language as the basis of the state's creation implied that other key elements of identity such as the south Slav's distinct histories and previous experience, their diverse explanations and as well as their various religious affiliations were ignored. This was an important flow in the creation of the state, as it did not take into serious account the different ethnic identities of its groups and it did not try to form a system that could assimilate them in a way that they would not constitute the base of the 1919 conflict.[14]

The communist regimes under Josip Broz Tito end after world war II. It was the federation of six republics, i.e., Bosnian-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia and of two autonomous provinces [Kosovo and Vojvodina] under the name of the socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1974 constitution. Its creation was based on the principle of the brotherhood and unity that was necessary for the states cohesion.[15] The communist did not found the state's re-creation on ethnic and language ties. They rather based the paradigm for solidarity among Yugoslav ethnic groups 'the doctrine of Yugoslavlism[16], i.e., a common Yugoslav identity that was beyond the individual ethnic ones.

Education played a crucial role in this attempt, since it is one of the most important means of identity formation. The principles of self-managed socialism as well as brotherhood and unity; as the key concepts of the common Yugoslav identity, were the most desired values in the educational objectives [17]. Yet, the communists attempt to create a common identity through the educational system based on these two paradigms proved not to be successful; instead, it brought forward more contradictions than it had expected. This result is due first, to the fact that the books of that period did not familiarise students with the idea of the multicultural society in which they had to live. They did not teach them effectively how to deal with ethnic diversity and distinctiveness, as they did not provide them with group had its own historical identity, which definitely deserved the respect of the others, but at the same time, it had to the peacefully embodied- within the larger spectrum of a common Yugoslavian one.

Factors that Stimulates Ethnic Conflicts

Homeland

Another main feature of ethnicity is the connection with a definite territory. Smith argues that it is the attachments and relations, rather than residence in or ownership of the land that matters for ethnic identification[26] Hence, an ethnic may persist, even in the case that is long divorced from its homeland though an intense melancholy and spiritual attachment. Thus, territory is an integral aspect of ethnic identity, as it represents the origins and the past of the group living in it or being attached to it, as well as its struggles to conquer it. It this way, it become a holy ground, or a sacred land of forefathers; kings and saints.[27]

The case of Kosovo is of particular relevance to Smith's theory of symbolic attachment with a given territory; Kosovo was for Serbs the cradle of their culture and nation. They called it 'our Jerusalem' emphasing thus their right on a territory that, as it was considered, was threatened by the existence of another ethnic group that of Albanians. On the other hand, Albanians has also developed strong symbolic attachment with the land. They chained historical rights derived from the ancient Illyrians who populated the Balkans before the settlement in the South Balkans before the settlement in the south Slavs.[28] Kosovo's case reveals the passion and the hatred that ethnicity can rise if it is manipulated by ethno nationalist political elites. In Kosovo, the emotional attachment to the land of the ethnic group excluded one another. Milosevic played an important role in the ethnic conflict. He appealed to the deep patriotic feelings of the Serbian people. He became their voices and fuel nationalistic feelings when he made statements like 'Serbian nationalism is a serpent deep in the bosom of the Serbian people'.[29] From this point on, we shall see how Milosevic used the historical memory and the attachment of the Serbian people to the homeland of Kosovo's for achieving his vision of a Greater Serbia under his own political control.

Milosevic's programme was based on the nationalist ideology. Bette Denitch referring to the ideology of nationalism says that it involves 'the exploitation of symbolic processes that mediate the communication between leaders and populaces invoking them to think, fell and act according to its premises. This is the manipulation of symbols with polarising emotional contest. Milosevic accordingly, used the emotional ties of the Serbs with Kosovo's territory in order to pursue his dream of a Greater Serbia that would not only incorporate Kosovo, but also lands where many Serbs lived, such as Eastern Slavonia and Krajina. Milosevic tried to manipulate people's patroticism and fuel nationalism in them by appealing to their traumatic historical memories on the land. During his 1987 visit in Kosovo's polje, he molibised aspects of the Serbian ethnicity, such as the sacrifice of Prince Lazer, such as to strengthen people's attachment with the land.

He urged them in an indirect way to fight for their rights in the area, reassured them in the area, and reassured them that 'Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give Kosovo away'.[30] At Polje, Milosevic 'had cannily identified the instrument necessary for his political advancement' that was the politicisation of ethnicity's attributes mainly that of historical myths and the association people have with a particular land.

Political

Milosevic also tried to achieve this purpose and to instil his nationalist ideology through the manipulation of the mass media. The reaction government was portrayed by the broadcast media as fascists seeking to exterminate all Serbs and Germany and Austria were blamed for supporting the Croatian fascism. This image of the Croatian authorises as Ustase was re-force by their decision to replace the flag with Chequered Squares resembling the symbol used by the Ustase during world war II.[31] Also, the war in Croatia was presented as the struggled for the Serbian people against the processes of genocide by the Ustase Croatian party of Franjo Tudjman. The Serbian media spread the fear all over Yugoslavia ethnic hatreds, the Balkan ghosts were coming more, and more to the surface, as the nationalist propaganda continued by the Croatian media after 1990, that the HDZ took over their control. Consequently, the historical myth and memories of Yugoslavia's ethnic groups as well as their attachments to particular territories became central device in the process of national emancipation.

Religion

Pavkovic asserted that religious affiliations case became a significant marker of ethnicity. Therefore, religion is considered as the most important element of a common culture; and religion symbols, ritual and institutions were used to activate aggressive nationalism feelings for the promotion of political agendas.[32] Yugoslavia's ethnic groups were differentiated in their religious beliefs, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians and eastern orthodox. Croats and slavianes are Roman Catholics, while in Bosnian-Herzegovina there is a sizeable Muslim population.[33] The differentiation in terms of the various religious affiliations created distinctive customs. Rituals and beliefs, which shaped the everyday life of the groups. The separate calendars prescribed a separate set of feast days even for the common Christian celebrations. In particular, Serb eastern orthodox developed two distinct cults; that of the medieval founder of the Serb Orthodox Church, St. Sava, and that of the Kosovo martyrs. The celebration of these two cults clearly marks off the Serb orthodox from the Roman catholic believer.[34] However, those differences in the way of life and religion, although they differentiated the culture of Yugoslavia's groups, they could not have shaped a national ideology capable of leading to an ethnic conflict. It was again the politicisation of these religious identities and the polarisation of the people along

ethnic lines that created the conditions for the conflict. An example proving that is the dramatic rise of the Muslim's religious identities in Bosnia. Such identities had not been so strong before their politicisation. The Serbs, Croats and Muslims of the area live peacefully for many years as neighbours, even though there were differenced in their religious dogmas. As Huntington mention, Muslims were Bosnians who did not go to the mosques, Croats were Bosnians who did not go to the cathedral and Serbs were Bosnians who did go to the orthodox church.[35] It was when the elites started ethnic identity and, to quote Huntington again, each ethnic group identified itself with its broader cultural community and define itself in religious terms.[36]

In 1990, the Muslims of Bosnia voted for the Muslims party of Democratic Action [SDA] led by Alija Izetbegovic. He was a devoted Muslim, imprisoned for his Islamic activitism by the communist government. He introduced to the Muslim society the 'pan-Islamic version of nationalism; which regarded Islam as the immutable core of Muslim ethnic and political identity'.[37] He aimed at the revival of an authentic Islamic consciousness and he argued for 'the incompatibility of Islam with non- Islam with non- Islamic system.' There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institution.[38]

It was further argued by Izetbegovic to affirm the Islamic religiously defined ethnic identity in politics and tried to promote a project of an Islamic society, where non-Muslims were second-class citizens with no political rights [39] This resulted in the reaction of the Serbs and Croats, as it is view as a force towards the political dominations of the Muslims in Bosnia. Soon; the conflict took dimensions of genocide, as the Serbs cleansed the Bosnian town of Zvopnik of its 40,000 Muslims and the symbols of the opposing religion became destroying mosques, and Croats blowing up orthodox monasteries.[40] Consequently, religion as a fundamental aspect of ethnicity, became a useful political tool in the hands of the elites for the promotion of their own plans.

History of Ethnic Conflict in Thailand

Thailand's separatist insurgence lasted for the period of 40 years. The insurgency, which has been spearheaded by different groups at different point in time, largely quelled in the 1990s.[41] This was perhaps true until, few years ago, when violence returned to the region, and increased with no sign of abatement. The transition into violence could this be described as a frozen conflict that has thawed. The day that most analysts point to in the resurgence of violence is January 4 2004. When suspected insurgents railed an Army camp in Narathiwat province, curled away more than 400 weapons, and killed Buddhist camp guards while sparing the Muslims.[42] That day, insurgent also launched simultaneous attached in more than

20 locations around the regions in an apparent diversionary tactic prevent reinforcements from responding to the raid.

In a five year span between January 2004 and march 2009, Srisom Phop Jitpiromsiri counted some 8,810 violent incidents that resulted in 3,418 deaths and 5, 624 injuries. Most of the victims have been civilians, accounting for 45.8% of these who died. In terms of religious affiliations, the resurgent violence has claimed mostly Muslims about 54.7% deaths, who are believed to have been killed because of their perceived alliance to the Thai state.[43] Suspected insurgents have primarily employed shootings, arisen and banking as dominant tactics in their campaign. No group has claim responsibility for the upsurge in violence or even any incident.[65]

The progression of conflict in the southern Thailand followed largely parallel stages in the 20th century up to the 1970s. At around the turn of the 20th century, the country had become an independent nation-state. The country has also instituted systematic measure to strengthen its control of the minority population. Generally, the measure involved the imposition of a single ethnicity as the basis for nation building, which threatened to erode the identity of the locals. In response, leaders of ethnic minorities 'demanded for self-government before the emergence of more radical armed groups that fought separation.'[44] Through the years, armed movement fighting for independent have shifted in ideology orientation in claiming for independence, from secular independence movements toward more religious-oriented and religious –based movement. This has prompted several analysts to warn about links of this insurgence with the international terrorist groups. Major turning points in the history of the conflict can be seen in the shift in methods by government in addressing the armed movement. The Thailand government used economic development and political measures during the 1980s to promote the right of the Malay Muslims in the three southern border provinces. However, the prevailing strategy western used of military suppression of the rebellions.[45] With the full incorporation of the formerly independent territories into the national borders. Thailand instituted measures that sought to consolidate the modern nation-state.

In addition, to the non-accommodations of minority identities, history and aspirations. Key program of the government of the Thailand also contributed to the present state of the minority, and which especially played significant roles in instigating resistance among the Muslims of the southern parts.[46] The change in the educational system, totally adoption of Thai language thus marginlisation of the predominate Islamic school system and the Melayu language. Addition new image of 'Thai-ness' and Thai nationalism were developed and imposed. The government further introduced National culture act, which alter the identities of

the minorities to be called officially 'Thai Islam or Thai Muslims.' This term recognised religious diversity but downplayed the differences in ethnicity aiming Thai citizens. The government also abolished Islamic family and inheritance laws and imposed Thai civil law. These were also attempts to convert Muslims to Buddhism.[47]

The constricted spaces for the recognition of minority identity and aspirations led to traditional leaders to negotiate with the state. Malay Muslims asked United Nations to oversee accession of the Thai provinces of Patani, Narathiwat and Yala to the federated state of Malaya. In 1947, religious leader Hai Sulong submitted a seven-point petition to the government to grant greater autonomy for Patani and guarantee the preservation of Malay Muslims culture. These efforts were not granted under the framework of the state seeking to preserve territorial integrity under a unitary system. While these proposals might have been radical, in content these still utilised legal state channels. Their eventual failure contributed to the emergence of organised armed separatist movements later. The Thailand government used the military forces and the parliament to suppress the activities of the insurgence movement, in order to stop or control the minorities' demands but to no avail. The role of the external actors was another element that influenced the conflict.

Conclusion

Ethnicity did play an important role in Yugoslavia ethnic conflict. From the beginning of the States' creation, ethnicity was an important flaw. The communist regime suppressed the various ethnic identities of the groups and tried to create a Yugoslavia one based on 'supra-ethnic elements. Yet, the imperial suppression of these identities proved costly indeed, for when they permitted expression they took shape brutal forms.[48] The guilt of the political elites for giving expression to these identities and for emphasing, and politicising their differences for their own political purposes cannot be denied. In Yugoslavia's ethnic conflict, all the symbolic power that ethnicity can provide was manipulated in such a way that fanned the flames for an aggressive ethno-nationalism to emerged as a force that finally led to chaos.

Ethnicity became the most prevalent element of the groups' identification. The political elite played a central role in it. According to Bourdieu, it is political leaders who stress the differences, who have the power of 'imposing the vision of division,' that open social divisions that are inherent. It is the power to make groups, to manipulate the objective structure of society. Yugoslavia was led to this sad ending mostly due to the emergence of nationalism, and within this context, ethnicity's politicisation offered fertile group for the nationalistic ideologies to disintegrate the state and lead its people to conflict. Ethnicity thus

became the 'meat for the nationalist meal', and was perceived as an instrument for the realisation of political plans. The power of ethnicity lies in its capacity to arouse passion and commitment and it was because this symbolic power of ethnicity was taken full advantage of and was manipulated in such a way that Yugoslavia was led to ethnic conflict at the end of the 20th century. In southern Thailand, the ethnic separatist movement spurred the formation of a number of groups seeking separation of the Patani region from Thailand and the abandonment with the other former territories of the sultanate in British Malaya.

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